Radar Data Replicator

Concepts

• radar
• bristol
• joint sensors and engagement networks delivery team
• ground based air defence
• support of the radar data replicator
• radar data replicator
• primary air defence radars
• radar plot
• strobe data
• primary user of these data feeds

Location

Portsmouth:

Description

The Joint Sensors and Engagement Networks Delivery Team (JSENS DT), part of the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD), intends to place a contract with IBM UK Limited (the Contractor) for the support of the Radar Data Replicator (RDR) equipment that will enable the UK’s Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) system, to access and receive radar plot and strobe data from primary Air Defence Radars without impacting the IBM delivered Command and Control System (CCS) which is the primary user of these data feeds.

Total Quantity or Scope

The Radar Data Replicator (RDR) equipment will enable the UK’s Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) system, to access and receive radar plot and strobe data from primary Air Defence Radars without impacting the IBM delivered Command and Control System (CCS) which is the primary user of these data feeds.

Award Detail

Award Criteria

CPV Codes

• 35722000 - Radar

Legal Justification

It is considered that this requirement can be awarded using the negotiated procedure without prior publication of a contract notice pursuant to Article 28(1)(e) of Directive 2009/81/EC (Regulation 16(1)(a)(ii) of the UK Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations 2011) for technical reasons. The Contractor is the only entity able to safely deliver this requirement. Using a different supplier to support the above equipment will introduce an intolerable level of safety risk directly to the IBM Command and Control System (CCS) Safety Case and also to the overarching ASACS (Air Surveillance and control system ) System Safety Case. The Contractor is the MOD Safety Case holder and will be required to consider and sign off hazards and risks introduced by this system at their external interface as the capability will be required to physically connect directly to the IBM CCS in addition to the GBAD system. In addition, the capability will form part of the wider ASACS System, and so it’s safety case will also need to form part of the overarching ASACS system safety case. Both the CCS and ASACS safety cases must follow the mandated policy and guidance of the Military Aviation Authority (MAA) Regulatory Articles and will be audited for compliance with these regulations by the MAA. In order to retain the security integrity of the end to end data provided to the MOD Command and Control System, it is technically impractical for anyone other than the Contractor to provide this requirement. Any alternative supplier would lead to an unacceptable level of security accreditation risk being placed on this assured data service within the ASACS system.

Other Information

** PREVIEW NOTICE, please check Find a Tender for full details. ** It is considered that this requirement can be awarded using the negotiated procedure without prior publication of a contract notice pursuant to Article 28(1)(e) of Directive 2009/81/EC (Regulation 16(1)(a)(ii) of the UK Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations 2011) for technical reasons. The Contractor is the only entity able to safely deliver this requirement. Using a different supplier to support the above equipment will introduce an intolerable level of safety risk directly to the IBM Command and Control System (CCS) Safety Case and also to the overarching ASACS (Air Surveillance and control system ) System Safety Case. The Contractor is the MOD Safety Case holder and will be required to consider and sign off hazards and risks introduced by this system at their external interface as the capability will be required to physically connect directly to the IBM CCS in addition to the GBAD system. In addition, the capability will form part of the wider ASACS System, and so it’s safety case will also need to form part of the overarching ASACS system safety case. Both the CCS and ASACS safety cases must follow the mandated policy and guidance of the Military Aviation Authority (MAA) Regulatory Articles and will be audited for compliance with these regulations by the MAA. In order to retain the security integrity of the end to end data provided to the MOD Command and Control System, it is technically impractical for anyone other than the Contractor to provide this requirement. Any alternative supplier would lead to an unacceptable level of security accreditation risk being placed on this assured data service within the ASACS system.